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THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL: A FRIEND
OF THE COURT?
HENRY J. ABRAHAM t AND ROBERT R. BENEDETTI It
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either
the sword or the purse . . . It may truly be said to have
neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment, and must ulti-
mately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the
efficacy of its judgments.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
I. FUNCTION OF THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN STATE
COMPLIANCE WITH SUPREME COURT RULINGS
Enforcement of judgments usually is given only a page or two in
any good text on the Supreme Court.1 Discussion is held to the need
for the "aid of the executive arm" by an allusion to Jackson's infamous
outburst 2 or Lincoln's rebuttal of Taney,' and if the author associates
judicial compliance with enforcement, he may add a discussion of lower
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1 See, e.g., J. FRANK, MARBL PALACE 37-41 (1958). For a few of the limited
number of articles on the subject, see Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt:
Tennessee Reaction to the "Schempp" Decision, 10 MIDWEST J. POL. ScI. 304 (1966) ;
Sorauf, Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision, 53 Aax. PoL.
Sci. REv. 777, 784-91 (1959) ; Patric, The Impact of a Court Decision: Aftermath of
the McCollum Case, 6 J. PUB. LAW 455 (1957).
2 "John Marshall has delivered his opinion, now let us see him enforce it."
G. MYERS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 357 (1912).
3Message from President Lincoln to Congress, July 4, 1861, in D. SILVER,
LINCOLN'S SUPREME COURT 35 (1956).
(795)
796 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
courts and their role in remanded cases. But are there further instances
of the gap between judicial theory and American practice?
The failure of analysis to penetrate deeper than these examples
into the enforcement process may be explained by assumptions often
made concerning the relation of the Supreme Court to the American
people. Americans are thought to stand in awe of the law as ex-
plicated by any court, and most particularly by the Supreme Court.'
Furthermore, there may be an overemphasis of the fact that the Court
treats specific cases only. Never legislative in the proper sense,
Supreme Court-made law is assumed to filter slowly downward as rele-
vant cases arise rather than to impress itself fully on all practice at
one and the same time. The Court allows time for accommodation and
the people respond positively, if imperceptively, to this easy tempo. In
other words, compliance is thought to be a natural sociological process.
Today, if not before, such a portrait of compliance must be refined,
at least in some areas of the law. It is common knowledge that in the
field of civil liberties the Supreme Court has treated a multitude of
"class actions" and insisted on compliance with "all deliberate speed." 6
Equally well-known is the defiance of Court directives in Little Rock,
Oxford, and Montgomery. There, in lieu of "historic reverence," only
the force of the national guard, United States marshals, and the
Department of Justice could elicit compliance with the judicial
directive.
These agencies are manifestations of the federal executive power.
However, the distinct executive powers of the individual states
have also been exercised during the recent civil liberties conflicts.
This is not unexpected as most of the practices struck down by the
Court in the civil rights and liberties area have involved state, not
federal, statutes.7 What may be surprising is that state executives have
so often used their powers in direct defiance of the Court. It is the
governors, not the Presidents, who have most recently taken up
Jackson's heresy.
4 Examples which illustrate the betrayal of the Supreme Court by both federal
and state judges are numerous and instructive. See Murphy, Lower Court Checks on
Supreme Court Power, 53 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 1017 (1959).
5
No one can have seen the pilgrims who fill the ornate Court room during
public sessions, under the bas-reliefs of great law givers like Napoleon, with-
out being struck by this historical reverence which is something won, not
simply conferred. And the audience does answer the prayer of the usher, 'God
save the United States and this honourable Court.'
D. BROGAN, POLITICS IN AmERICA 415 (1954).
6See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (public school
desegregation order).
7See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 284 (2d ed. 1968).
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However, it becomes difficult in many cases to distinguish
stiff resistance from good politics. The governors may realize that
they must comply, but they may also feel that the office requires them
to symbolize the resistance which is strongly felt among the people they
represent. To meet this problem a test of the depth of commitment of
state executives to a course of opposition should involve observations
of administrators other than the governor. Whatever the content of
gubernatorial speeches, it would be more useful to examine the degree
to which a governor's administration will implement a particular
decision.
Attention is thus focused on the quasi-judicial officer in the
administration whose job it is to bridge the gap between law and
state practice: the state attorney general. In theory, the ethics of
his profession should compel the attorney general to comply with the
Court, and his position should give him the necessary powers of
enforcement. Of more interest is the attorney general's actual practice:
how, in fact, does he seek to implement the law of the land as ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court? Since the role of the attorney general
in the implementation of Supreme Court decisions depends upon the
nature and powers of his office, an analysis of these functions and
institutional limits should precede a discussion of how they are actually
used to further or impede compliance with the Court's declarations
of law.'
The attorney general does not fit neatly within the framework de-
scribed by the doctrine of separation of powers, since he exercises both
executive and judicial functions.' As an executive he gives legal
advice to the governor and to the rest of the administration; he repre-
sents executive agencies at the bar; he conducts investigations into
state practices; "o and in many states he has some role in the adminis-
tration of justice at the local level." The majority of students in public
8 Unfortunately, a paucity of scholarship in this area makes even institutional
analysis difficult. See B. ABERNETHY, SOME PER SISTING QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE EXECUTIVE 37-39 (1960); D. Akers, The Advisory Opinion
Function of the Attorney General, 38 Ky. L.J. 561 (1950).
9 A case could also be made that the attorney general is a legislative official.
In almost one-third of the states (15), he not only advises legislators on specific
questions of law, but also plays a major role in the drafting of legislation. THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OUR STATE LEGISLATURES 30-31 (rev. ed. 1948).
10 See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959), and Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957), for interesting comments on the constitutionality of investigations
by one particular attorney general pursuant to a broad mandate of the state legislature.
11 Some commentators lament the fact that the state attorney general plays such
a minor role in local law enforcement. They usually suggest statewide centralization
of law enforcement officers as well as district attorneys, with the state attorney
general's office as the focus. See W. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATiON 115-26 (1929).
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administration emphasize these functions and therefore consider the
attorney general to be the governor's attorney and administrator.
Typical of their conception of his proper role is the recurring effort to
have the attorney general appointed by the governor.1
2
Despite this popular assessment of his role, the attorney general is
in fact elected or appointed independently of the governor in a vast
majority of states, and this independence has been preserved in spite
of an occasional wave of reform." When queried, both governors and
attorneys general saw this independence as essential in maintaining the
sensitivity necessary for the correct disposition of the office:
A thin and not too easily defined thread of thought runs
through all their comments which seems to say that this is
not solely a ministerial post; that its responsibilities go beyond
and embrace something of the judicial and perhaps even of
the representative; . . . and that here is an institution about
which hangs an aura of the ancient and of the common law,
as well as constitutional statutory law, which marks it for
special status and stature in the state governmental
structure.' 4
This judicial function is frankly recognized in Tennessee where the
attorney general is appointed by the justices of the state supreme
court. 5 Whether or not independent selection of an attorney general
emphasizes the office's judicial aspect, the duties and powers of a
judicial nature which are attached to it are significant. In all states,
the attorney general is empowered to issue advisory opinions which
are customarily regarded as having the force of law unless and until
tested in court. In some states, he can be requested by the state
supreme court to submit opinions toward the explication of difficult
judicial issues.'"
While architects of model state constitutions feel compelled to make
a choice between the administrative and judicial roles when determining
proper procedures for the election or appointment of attorneys general
12 See ABERNErHY, supra note 8, at 42-48; J. PHILLIPS, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT Im AfmlcA 208 (1954).
13 Forty-two states elect their attorney general popularly; in Maine, he is
appointed by the legislature and in Tennessee by the State Supreme Court; in New
Hampshire by the governor and council; in Alaska, Hawaii, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
and Wyoming, by the governor. For details on the relevant reform movements, see
ABERNErHY, srupra note 8, at 33.
14 Id. 38; for other results of the survey, see id. 34-43.
1-5 TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 5.
I'Larson, The Importance and Value of Attorney General Opinions, 41 IowA
L. Ray. 351, 367 (1956). Such an opinion was requested by the Florida Supreme
Court when Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instr., 374 U.S. 487 (1963),
was remanded. The Florida court subsequently interpreted the prayer decision as
inapplicable to Dade County.
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to office, 7 for the sake of this discussion it is only necessary to
acknowledge a confusion or confluence of roles. The problem of
compliance with the Supreme Court decisions centers primary attention
on the attorney general as author of advisory, yet effectively binding,
opinions on points of law. Although as defender of state agencies and
informal adviser to state courts, legislators, and governors, the attorney
general may determine state compliance in subtler ways, the advisory
opinion is clearly his most potent weapon.
An advisory opinion issued by an attorney general may take
three forms: an oral opinion, a letter opinion, and a formal opinion.,'
For most purposes the first two categories may be collapsed into one
simply designated "advice." It is on the formal opinions alone that
the attorney general is willing to stand firm against administration
and public alike. He will render a formal opinion to any state official
entitled to one upon request, though there is a question in some states
whether any local officials have a right to request such opinions. 9 The
attorney general is not bound by the principle of stare decisis, though he
often finds it useful to achieve continuity in administrative practice. 0
His opinion may raise state and/or federal questions and treat matters
of both law and fact; that is, it can discuss the merits of a particular
case as well as the relevant points of law. The attorney general's
opinion thus has the scope, if not the force, of a trial court decision.
Although state "officers cannot be forced to follow a requested
attorney general's opinion," 21 formal opinions do seem to carry a
sizable amount of legal force. Their power derives from custom and
practical considerations rather than from legal compulsion. The state
official who defies the advice of the attorney general does so at
considerable peril, for it is the attorney general who will represent the
official in court if his actions precipitate a suit. Such a suit may even
be encouraged by press coverage of the formal opinions, which could
themselves provide the plaintiff with a ready-made legal framework
for his case. Moreover, state courts have traditionally regarded highly
the wisdom of formal opinions and have seldom seen fit to overturn
them. Unfortunately for the recalcitrant official, the only legal appeal
from a formal opinion does lie with the courts, which are already prej-
udiced in favor of the opinion. Thus, fortified against attack, the
17 The model architects have generally favored an "executive" view of the office.
See ABERrrny, supra note 8, at 33-34.
I8 Larson, supra note 16, at 353.
1 Id. 356-59.
20 Akers, supra note 8, at 578-79; Larson, mpra note 16, at 367-68.
21 Larson, supra note 16, at 360-61.
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issues treated formally by the attorney general are seldom brought
before the bench.
2
The attorney general of every state issues formal opinions,
though several states do not publish his opinions regularly. The
practice persists even in the ten states which presently allow advisory
opinions to be issued by their state supreme courts.' The advisory
opinions of the courts are often restricted in subject and difficult to
obtain. 4 Most states limit the right of request to the governor and
the legislature. Thus even in these states the attorneys general are
important sources of advisory opinions because of the breadth of their
mandate and the relative ease in securing their advice. Furthermore,
the opinions issued by attorneys general do not seem to be of less legal
force than advisory opinions issued by the courts."
The power to draft such an instrument makes the state attorney
general a potential vehicle for, or impediment to, the will of the
Supreme Court. The time has now come to examine its use. How
do attorneys general across the land utilize their power when faced
with a Court decision directly relevant to state practice?
To explore this question properly a sample of representative Court
decisions should be selected as stimuli and the responses of a sample
representative of all state attorneys general analyzed; but such a
research design is beyond the scope of this article. As a pre-test for
any further empirical studies in this area, we have chosen to use the
case study.
Previous studies have attempted to analyze the variance in the
response pattern of one attorney general when different stimuli were
introduced, though they did not consider Supreme Court decisions as
relevant stimuli. 6 This form of analysis was not chosen here because
of the length of time between Supreme Court cases likely to provoke
response and the uncertainty of their occurrence. A Supreme Court
decision is only occasionally so relevant to the life-style of a state
that the attorney general is compelled to react. On the other hand,
in the southern states where recent decisions have in fact attacked the
life-style, another problem arises: little variance in response has
occurred despite the matter of the decision. Resistance to the Court
2 2
R. MADDOX & R. FUQUAY, STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT 95 (1962).
23 Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, North Carolina, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Maine and Massachusetts.
24 See Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 HARv. L.
REV. 1302 (1956).
25 Cf. id. 1304.
26 Akers, supra note 8.
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has become a popular path to follow and few examples of compliance
are available for comparison.
The second alternative, which we have adopted, is to study the
variance of all attorneys general over a single issue. Though it may
be convincingly argued that the issue we have chosen is so exceptional
as to preclude generalization, we find that it creates enough variance
among the population to suggest interesting hypotheses. This is the
restricted, yet heuristic, goal we have set for this study.
II. ACTIVITY OF THE STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL FOLLOWING A
SUPREME COURT RULING WITH EXTENSIVE IMPACT
On June 17, 1963, the United States Supreme Court handed
down an eight-to-one decision in School District v. Schempp and
Murray v. Curlett 2 7 holding the ceremonial reading of prayers and the
Bible in public schools to be a violation of the establishment clause
of the first amendment. Following the decision, observers found the
public reaction more subdued than might have been predicted, for prior
to Schempp over 41 per cent of the public schools conducted such
exercises. 8 Nevertheless, however subdued the overt reaction, public
opinion was strongly against the Court's action. A Gallup poll in
August showed 70 per cent of those polled against the decision; only 24
per cent supported it.29
The public schools were closing when the justices handed down
their decision, but as September drew near, officials pondered how the
schools should respond. Would they enforce an unpopular decision
within the community and if not, would any power restrain their dis-
obedience? Many doubted whether any enforcement lacking public
favor would succeed:
The question now is whether public opinion will in the
end agree with the Court that the neutrality required of
Government in religious matters forbids the imposition of
prayers in public schools.
27374 U.S. 203 (1963) (the cases were decided together).
28 For statistics, see R. DIERENFI ELD, RELIGION IN AmERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
51 (1962). One reason for the subdued response might have been the public's strong
reaction to Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), in which the Supreme Court held
that a nondenominational prayer composed by the New York Board of Regents and
required to be recited in public schools at the beginning of each day amounted to an
establishment of religion in violation of the first amendment, even though pupils who
wished to do so could remain silent or be excused from the room while the prayer
was being recited. The public may have spent its energy on the Engel case. See
Beaney & Beiser, Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the
Political Process, 13 J. PuB. L. 475, 483-85 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Beaney &
Beiser].
29 Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 484.
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If not, prayers will simply go on in thousands of
schools-because no parent will want to or have the courage
to protest. History will tell whether the Court in these cases
spoke for the conscience of the country. 0
In fact, studies of school practice during the fall semester of 1963
showed widespread compliance despite several major instances of
defiant reaction.3 ' Whether or not a state complied, however, the
attorney general was an active participant in many of them. Though
cause-effect patterns are difficult to establish, it is nevertheless possible
to explore what factors determine the activity of the state attorneys
general and how their activity affects state compliance. This section
and Section IV discuss the former problem; the effectiveness of the
attorneys general is treated in Section V.
Prior to Schenipp, 12 states and the District of Columbia had
statutes requiring the reading of the Bible and/or the recital of prayers
in the public schools, 6 states had statutes which specifically allowed
such practices, and 23 states condoned the practice without specific statu-
tory formulations." Within a year after this landmark decision, the
attorneys general of 17 states, or about 41 per cent of the states whose
practice was affected, wrote opinions explicating the issues involved.3
In 5 states, the attorney general became directly involved in litigation
which sought enforcement of the Court's decision.34 The period of one
30 Lewis, Public Mood Plays Big Role in Court Rulings, N.Y. Times, June 23,
1963, § 4, at 4, col. 6.
31 See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 486-91; L. Dawidowicz, Bible Reading
after the Schempp-Murray Decision 42-50, Dec. 1963 (mimeograph issued by the
American Jewish Committee) [hereinafter cited as Dawidowicz]. See also Way,
Survey Research on Judicial Decisions: The Prayer and Bible Reading Cases, 21
WESTERN POL. Q. 189 (1968).
32 The relevant statutes are listed in appendix A to this article. There are, of
course, several ways to classify state practice; see, e.g., D. BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION
AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 44-57 (1963) ; R. DIERENFIELD, supra note 28, at 21.
We have relied heavily on the listing of state practices in the amicus brief filed
by Maryland's attorney general in Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Pennsyl-
vania seemed to require Bible reading both before and after the 1959 revision of
their school code. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (1962). See School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205, 208 n.2 (1963).
We have placed North Dakota's statute in the "specifically allowed" category,
although it differs somewhat from the Indiana formula which provides that "[t]he bible
[sic] shall not be excluded from the public schools of the state." IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 28-5101 (1948). Under the North Dakota statute, inclusion is at the teacher's option,
but the manner is prescribed. N. D. CENT. CODE § 15-38-12 (1960).
33 Before Schempp, several attorneys general received inquiries about the practice,
but only in California and Wyoming were their opinions a moving force against
prayer and Bible reading in schools. See Appendix B, p. 826, infra.
34 Johns v. Allen, 231 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del. 1964) ; Adams v. Engelking, 232 F.
Supp. 666 (D. Idaho 1964); Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instr., 160
So.2d 97 (Fla.), remanded 377 U.S. 402 (1964), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 171 So.2d
535 (Fla. 1965); Attorney Gen. v. School Comm., 347 Mass. 775, 199 N.E.2d 553
(1964) ; Sills v. Board of Educ., 84 N.J. Super. 63, 200 A.2d 817 (1963), aff'd 42 N.J.
351, 200 A.2d 615 (1964).
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year following the Court's decision (June, 1963, to June, 1964) was
chosen for analysis of the activities of the attorneys general so that they
may be considered directly responsive to the Court's action.
An examination of these aggregate statistics produces several
interesting hypotheses. In those states which had statutes requiring
Bible reading there was a greater tendency for the attorney general to
issue an opinion: 10 of the 12 wrote an opinion or were involved in
litigation related to Schenipp or both. While this is not unexpected,
it is interesting that state procedure in several states allows the at-
torney general to interpret the validity of a standing statute. The
practice was followed even in states where courts are empowered to
issue advisory opinions." This power of review and judgment is
particularly impressive since the opinions of the attorney general are
seldom challenged.
In contrast, the 6 states which statutorily allowed, but did not
require, Bible reading produced no opinions on the issue. The reason
for this void is not clear. Perhaps the fact that the law was not
mandatory allowed state officials to pass the burden of decision to the
local school boards. Oklahoma and Iowa had traditionally left the
question of prayer entirely up to the local communities.36  The same
was probably the practice in Indiana, because the school boards of
Indianapolis and Bloomingdale took it upon themselves to revise their
practice following the Court's action." There is no evidence available
:5 Of the 12 states requiring prayer, 5 sanction judicial advisory opinions. In 3
of those 5 states, the attorneys general wrote opinions; in no state, however, did a
judicial advisory opinion issue. Furthermore, out of the 10 states allowing judicial
advisory opinions, note 23 sunpra, all of whom at least condoned prayer in the schools,
6 attorney general opinions issued. Thus it seems clear that the attorney general,
not the judiciary, was the crucial agent of compliance.
However, in March of 1967 the New Hampshire Senate did send two ('prayer"
bills and amendments already passed by the lower house to the New Hampshire
Supreme Court for an advisory opinion. One bill proposed the placing of plaques
declaring "In God we Trust" in each classroom; the second authorized a teacher to
hold morning exercises and was amended to allow the use of the Bible, Lord's Prayer,
or other devotional literature at the discretion of the teacher. While finding the first
proposal constitutional, the Justices took issue with the amended form of the second.
They upheld a "moment of silence" but found the reading from devotional literature
objectionable. Opinion of the Justices, 228 A.2d 161, 164 (N.H. 1967). The need for
this opinion may stem in part from the initial narrow construction of the New Hamp-
shire Attorney General when he wrote his opinion as well as the feelings of the
governor and congressmen. See text accompanying note 60 and app. C infra.
36 Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 488-89.
However, in September, 1966, and February, 1967 (after the period of this study,
June 1963 to June 1964), the Attorney General of Oklahoma did issue opinions con-
cerning the right of the individual teacher to initiate prayer and Bible reading in his
classroom "without express permission, direction, or requirement of a superior whose
authority is derived from the sovereign . . . ." In finding that the Court's prohibition
only extended to "laws" establishing religion, and not to the discretionary action of
teachers, he made it clear that Oklahoma law does not require Bible reading or
prayer, and thus approved the practice of teacher-initiated readings. Okla. Att'y
Gen., Opinions 66-256 (Sep. 7, 1966), & 67-123 (Feb. 23, 1967) (mimeograph).
S7 Dawidowicz, supra note 31, at 48.
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concerning the understanding in Kansas, Mississippi, and North
Dakota except that the attorneys general of the latter 2 states, as well
as their colleague in Oklahoma, reported to the Library of Congress
that compliance in their states was minimal even a year after the
decision."8 In all 6 states the statutes in question presently remain
unannotated in the statute books.3 9 It is reasonable to assume that
these attorneys general would have initiated some corrective action in
this area if they felt that state law or custom required their formal
intervention, unless, of course, a path of inaction resulted from their
opposition to the Supreme Court's holding.
Finally, the attorneys general wrote opinions in 9 of the 23 states
which condoned prayer and Bible reading without statutory support.
The trend is slightly more pronounced in favor of the production of
an opinion if the states in which courts had previously upheld Bible
reading are removed from consideration (the figures then become 8
states with opinions to 10 without). In the 5 states in which court
action upheld Bible reading despite the lack of specific statutory founda-
tion, only the attorney general of Colorado wrote an opinion. (Though
only two sentences in length, it indicates an affirmative attempt to com-
ply fully with Schempp. ° ) These figures support the findings of other
studies in which the attorney general has been pictured as a deus exz
machina. When state law is in chaos due to the lack of specific judicial
or legislative review, the opinion of the attorney general becomes im-
portant, if not imperative." After describing the lack of understanding
which followed Zorach v. Clauson, ' Professor Sorauf commented: "In
these circumstances the states' attorneys general, as the construers and
appliers of state limitations, assume an important role in charting the
38 Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 491 n.92.
39 See app. A, p. 822. Only in Mississippi did the attorney general give the
local officials any advice: "All principals [should] continue to recognize the supremacy
and many blessings of a great and just God as we have always done in our public
schools." Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 487. Nevertheless, all of these 6 states
made it clear that prayer was optional under their statute. In light of Professor
Boles's experience, it appears that the option has not always been exercised. Boles,
stpra note 32, at 52.
40
Under the recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Bible reading in the
public schools as a devotional exercise is prohibited no matter who the
sponsoring or supervising agent or agency. It makes no legal difference that
Bible reading as a devotional exercise is "permitted" rather than "required".
[1963-1964] CoLO. ATr'Y. GEi. BIENNIAL RFP. 33-34.
41 It may be that uncertainty was tolerated in 10 of the 18 states due to the
tradition of leaving school matters to local officials. Ohio seems to support this
inference, though New Hampshire, a state with a tradition of local option which
produced an opinion, does not. See Beaney & Beiser, .rpra note 28, at 488-89.
Information on other states is not available.
42 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (program permitting release of children from school to
attend religious services is constitutional).
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legal progress of released-time programs." 43 Professor Patric makes a
similar point in his discussion of McCollum v. Board of Education.'
Thus the attorney general tends to act where there is a need for
explanation of a particular area of the law, where judicial review is
absent, and where no legislative provision has been made for defining
proper state practice. It appears, then, that there is a need for state
government officials to know the duties imposed on them by the law
and a need for the people as a whole to understand the law if it is to
be followed. The attorney general explicates the state of the law,
positive and customary. Where law has been struck down, he predicts
the consequences. Where it has been obscured, he clarifies its pre-
scriptions. These legislative, judicial and executive roles blend in the
office of this unique administrator, an office that may extend further if
the attorney general comes to play the increased role in local enforcement
suggested by some public administration theorists.45
III. CONTENT OF THE FORMAL OPINIONS ISSUED
BY THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
In order to interpret the content of the written opinions, we have
arranged them according to the narrowness of the construction of the
Supreme Court's decision in Schempp and Murray. The narrowest
constructions were given by the attorneys general of Delaware and
Arkansas. They held that the decision was technically law only in
Pennsylvania and Maryland and that, until a case was brought in their
respective states, the traditional and mandatory use of prayer and Bible
reading should continue.4' Despite several difficulties, a suit was
finally instituted involving the Delaware statute and a federal court
overturned the attorney general's interpretation.4 7  As of June, 1964
(the end of our survey period), no such action had been undertaken in
Arkansas. In May the attorney general reported non-compliance
in the majority of the state schools. 48
The Attorney General of Georgia paid lip service to this doctrine
of limited applicability, but worried over the irresponsibility of such a
construction:
43 Sorauf, supra note 1, at 783.
44333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction in school held unconstitutional). See
Patric, mipra note 1, at 459-63.
45 See note 11 supra.
46 Opinions of the Att'y Gen. of Del. 78, Opinion No. 63-022, Aug. 12, 1963 (un-
published mimeograph). Upon request, the Office of the Attorney General of Arkansas
was unable to furnish a copy of the relevant opinion. Information concerning the
content of this unpublished opinion is given in Dawidowicz, supra note 31, at 43-44.
47Johns v. Allen, 231 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del. 1964).
48 Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 491 n.92.
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Although the Murray and Schempp decisions are bind-
ing only upon the parties to these cases and are not technically
the "law of the land," I would be derelict in my official duty
were I to advise you [the State School Superintendent] and
other public officials of this state to do other than to abide
by the rulings of the Supreme Court as long as they are in
force and effect.49
He interpreted the Court's action to allow the voluntary gathering of
students and teachers for prayer or Bible reading during "freedom
of belief" periods before supervised activities are to begin. He added
that such arrangements should be made by students and without the
direction or supervision of the school staff in order that the State not
be formally involved."° However, no further delineation of the line
between legal and illegal practice was offered, and he ended with words
which almost seemed to suggest disobedience:
Thus it is that religion is a personal matter, the efficacy of
which is dependent upon its being a voluntary offering
directed only by reason and conviction.
Without offering any apology should I be accused of
indulging in religious emotionalism, it is my fervent hope,
born of considered reason and deep conviction, that "In God
we trust" may never be removed from the public schools, the
public affairs and the governmental structure of this State."-
This failure to clarify the degree of required compliance 52 led the
Georgia School Superintendent to believe that he was following the
Attorney General's meaning when he urged local boards to continue
chapel and Bible reading on a voluntary basis." Along with Arkansas,
Georgia still reported non-compliance in the majority of her schools as
of May, 1964."
The opinions issued by the attorneys general of North and South
Carolina, while not denying the applicability of Schempp to local
practice, attempted to blunt the impact of the Court's opinion. Grady
L. Patterson, an Assistant Attorney General for the State of South
Carolina, after several pages which quoted extensively from the Engel99
and Schempp decisions, wrote:
The Supreme Court held that the reading of the Bible and
repeating the Lord's Prayer in religious exercises in the
49 [1963-65] GA. ATT'y GEN. OPINIONs 263, 267.
50 Id. 263.
51 Id. 268.
52 A later opinion to the Department of Education, dated Sept. 4, 1964, indicates
that a further attempt at clarification was made as time passed. [1963-1965] GA.
ATr'Y GEN. OPINIONs 573.
63 Dawidowicz, mipra note 31, at 44.
54 Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 491 n.92.
69 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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public schools under the circumstances in these cases is un-
constitutional as violative of the First Amendment to the
Constitution. The Court concluded that "in both cases the
laws required religious exercises." "I
The italicized phrases imply, if subtly, that under circumstances other
than those precisely present in Pennsylvania and Maryland, where laws
do not require the religious exercise, such practice might be per-
missible. In other words, the teacher who on his own opens class
with a prayer, does not do so under the mandate of the legislature
or local school board and does not violate the law.
The Attorney General of North Carolina leaves an even wider
loophole:
The reading of the Bible and recitation of prayers in the
public schools can be properly engaged in on a voluntary
basis. It would be constitutionally invalid if such reading
of the Bible and saying of prayers were by order of a school
board or other State agency. 7
This opinion can be interpreted not only as justifying the actions of
the hypothetical teacher described above, but also as sanctioning an
understanding of "voluntary" specifically rejected by the Court:
Nor are these required exercises mitigated by the fact that
individual students may absent themselves upon parental
request for that fact furnishes no defense to a claim of un-
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause.58
Simply reading the attorney general's words, it is not clear whether
he would follow South Carolina, and interpret "voluntary" as de-
scriptive of the teacher's actions only, or would attempt a more direct
subversion of the Court by condoning prayer as long as student par-
ticipation is voluntary. The same ambiguity appears in the statement
given the press by Governor Sanford:
We will go on having Bible reading and prayer in the schools
of this state just as we always have. . . . We do not require
the Bible reading and prayer, but we do these things because
we want to. As I read the decision, this kind of thing is not
forbidden by the Court, and indeed, it should not be.' 9
rc [1963-1964] S.C. A&'Y GEN. REP. 107, 110 (emphasis added).
67 37 N.C. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 19 (1964).
(is 374 U.S. at 224-25.
59 Speech by Gov. Sanford, Sept. 16, 1963, quoted in Beaney & Beiser, mtpra
note 28, at 488.
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However, despite the latitude provided by these statements, the
Attorney General, when questioned in May of 1964, felt that his state
was not complying with the ruling in Schempp. If he is consistent,
this must mean that local boards continued to require prayer from both
teacher and student.
In another narrow construction of Schempp the New Hampshire
Attorney General advised that the formation of spontaneous prayer
groups would be acceptable and found it permissible for state officials
"to encourage and promote such voluntary prayer gatherings" and
"to call regular meetings during school hours for silent prayer or for
student silent reading of prayers or tracts that any such student may
bring to school with them [sic]." 60
The remaining attorneys general resisted these temptations and
affirmed clearly that the active participation of a state employee, even
a teacher, in the administration of prayers or Bible reading is pro-
hibited. While only 7 of the remaining 11 opinions specifically mark
out the proper stance for the individual teacher, 2 additional opinions
include statements of a general nature which make clear the prohibition
of such practices as prayer reading even when authorized only by the
teacher."' The remaining 2 opinions, though positive in their affirma-
tion of the Court's prohibition of Bible reading and prayer, did not
broach the question of teacher initiative. 2
While prohibiting the participation of teachers in religious exer-
cises, almost all of these 11 opinions take the time to argue that the
Court's ruling does not prohibit all religious activity in the public
schools. Periods of silent meditation may be set aside; students may
congregate before and after school or during rest and lunch periods
for the purpose of prayers. Furthermore, baccalaureate services,
graduation blessings, and Christmas and Easter celebrations may con-
tinue. The Supreme Court's recommendation that the academic study
of all religions be taken up in public school curriculums also found its
way into several opinions. Though anxious that the letter of the law
be obeyed, the attorneys general seemed to want to find reasonable
alternatives for the prohibited action or to encourage satisfaction with
what the Court had allowed to remain rather than outrage at that
GoLetter from the Attorney General of New Hampshire to the Governor, Nov.
6, 1963. See Dawidowicz, supra note 31, at 46.
G1The 7 specific opinions come from Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia; the 2 general opinions from
Colorado and Maine. See app. A, p. 822 infra. For the opinion of the Attorney
General of Colorado, see note 44 supra.
2 New Jersey and Oregon. See app. A, p. 822 infra. This omission is not
surprising in the case of Oregon as the opinion deals primarily with the constitution-
ality of baccalaureate services.
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which had been swept away. Even the Attorney General of Massachu-
setts, Edward Brooke, who found the Court's decision to cover a wide
variety of practices, was willing to engage in some hairsplitting in
order not to leave his constituents without an alternative to traditional
practice. While he objected to the setting aside of a moment of silent
"prayer," he would condone a moment of silent "meditation." 
All of these opinions represent a balance, struck by the attorney
general, between the law of the Court and the feelings of the people as
he assesses them. While Americans may still resolve political prob-
lems into legal problems and bring them ultimately to the Supreme
Court, the decisions of the Court now, if not before, must undergo a
process whereby judicial reasoning is politically tempered and made
acceptable to the people. If it is true, as we have implied in our intro-
ductory remarks, that a slow process of compliance will often be un-
acceptable, then a prerequisite of speed may be the type of mediation
carried out in this case by the state attorneys general. The need for
further interpretation and even compromise is often clear where the
Court voids a practice in one state that is widespread among the
several states. Some agency must bridge the gap between the isolated
case treated by the Court and the practice of a nation. An adminis-
trative officer, the attorney general, not a lower court of law, has
fulfilled this function in the case under consideration. One wonders
how many similar situations exist.
IV. FACTORS EXPLAINING REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE SCOPE
AND SUBSTANCE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL ACTIVITY
The attempt to balance law and popular opinion is not always
successful. Most attorneys general were able to achieve a happy
medium, but 5 men compromised the law in favor of popular opinion
and at least 2 were unable, without further litigation, to convince the
populace that the law should be accepted. The way in which this
balance is struck may be related to the personal convictions of, or the
political pressures upon, an individual attorney general. Of interest
in this regard are not only the 6 states in which the opinions failed
to give the Court's command proper breadth, but also those states
which failed to produce any opinion. We have previously indicated
that the production of an opinion may depend on the traditions of
local autonomy as well as the prior actions taken by the legislature
or courts. Geographic and political factors may also be relevant.
63 [1963-1964] MAss. ATT'y GEy. REP. 84, 88-89.
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Again, we emphasize that a cause-effect relationship cannot be estab-
lished from our data; however, it is possible to show some of the
variables which place these specific acts in context and something of
their relative importance.
Geography provided the clearest cleavage in the data. Southern
pens were no more nor less active than those in the country as a whole:
4 of the 11 southern states 14 produced opinions and Florida's attorney
general was involved with litigation concerning the decision. 5 How-
ever, the direction of the opinions and the litigation differed from
those evident in the rest of the country. None of the opinions fully
endorsed the Court's actions; 2 implied that the Court's decision did
not reach their practice (Arkansas and Georgia). The South was not
alone in its evasion of the opiniori, but other centers of resistance were
widely dispersed across the country. This implies that the South,
while utilizing the offices of the attorney general to the same extent
as the rest of the country, resolved the balance between the law and
public opinion heavily in favor of the people.
Why should this be so? In addition to all the factors peculiar to
southern politics, of which V.0. Key 6 and others have made us aware,
it is in the South that the practice of Bible reading and prayer in the
public schools was most widespread. 7 In no southern state was it
prohibited, and 5 required it. Furthermore, the attorneys general
of all but Virginia and Tennessee supported one or both briefs
presented to the Court by a group of state attorneys general in Engel
v. Vitale 68 and later in Schempp. 9  Both briefs urged the Supreme
Court to uphold the right to continue prayer and Bible reading in
the schools.
Political reaction to the Court's decision also appeared greater in
the South than elsewhere in the country. Three governors made
nationally publicized statements condemning the decision.70 Two others
were instrumental in the passage of a resolution at the 1962 Governors'
Conference which supported a Constitutional amendment to override
4 The 11 states are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.
65 Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instr., 171 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1965).
06 See V. 0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1st ed. 1949).
,7 It has been reported that 77% of the schools in the South conducted Bible
reading. Dierenfield, supra note 28, at 51.
68370 U.S. 421 (1962).
69 See app. C, p. 827 infra.
70 The governors of Alabama, North Carolina, and Mississippi were involved.
See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 486-8$.
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the Court's action.7' Three southern governors allowed their names
to be listed as supporters of the Constitutional Prayer Foundation, a
group lobbying before Congress for such an amendment.72  Moreover,
while the 11 southern states constitute only 24 per cent of the House,
33 per cent of the representatives who supported the amendment by
resolution or testimony were from these states.7  With such a con-
fluence of pressures, it is not unexpected that the attorneys general
followed the climate of opinion expressed by other elected officials.
However, to discover which factors were most important to their
decisions and whether others resisted similar pressures we must turn
away from the South and its peculiar characteristics.
In the West, including the Far West and Midwest, only 2 opinions
were written. The Colorado opinion read Schempp broadly,74 and
although the Oregon opinion considered permissible an invocation and
benediction by a member of the clergy in a public high school grad-
uation exercise, the opinion does not appear to be motivated by an
attempt to evade compliance with Schempp as do some of the opinions
discussed earlier.7' Actually, the small number of opinions is indica-
tive of little, since Bible reading and prayer were practiced by less
than 20 per cent of the schools in the Midwest and less than 12 per cent
of those in the Far West.76  Only one state in this whole area, Idaho,
required the prohibited practice, and there the issue was settled by
litigation.77
The eastern seaboard, on the other hand, is second only to the
South in the extent of prayer and Bible reading in schools, and 6
of the states required the practice by law. Following the line of
reasoning set forth above, it would be expected that this region would
show a greater disposition toward the production of opinions."3 This
71 Governor Bryant of Florida introduced the resolution and Governor Hollings of
South Carolina supported it. It should be noted, however, that Governor Reed of
Maine co-introduced the resolution and that it was also supported by Governor Combs
of Kentucky and Governor Notte of Rhode Island. See 1962 PROCEmINGS OF THE
GovERNoRs' CONFERE C E 65-68.
72 Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciar- on the Proposed Amed-
nents to the Con-stitution Relating to Prayers and Bible Reading in the Public Schools,
88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1209 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 Hearings].
Again, this fact is collateral, since the same number of supporting governors were
found in New England where no adverse opinions were produced.
73 1d. table of contents V-XVI; Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 492-93.
74 See note 44 supra.
7 5 See [1962-1964] ORE. ATT'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & op. 428.
76 Dierenfield, supra note 28, at 51.
77 Adams v. Engelking, 232 F. Supp. 666 (D. Idaho 1964).
78 We include here New England, the mid-atlantic states, and the border states
of Maryland, Kentucky, and West Virginia.
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expectation is more than gratified; 11 of the 13 states in the area
produced opinions. That there was a much higher percentage of
opinions written in the northeastern states than in the southern states
is, however, quite surprising. Since the two regions are very close
in both the proportion of schools practicing Bible reading and prayer,
and in the number of states requiring that practice, one would have
expected either more opinions in the South or fewer opinions in the
Northeast. Furthermore, in contrast to the southern practice, the
opinions emanating from the northern group of states, except for
New Hampshire and Delaware, clearly recognized the full scope of
Murray and Schernpp."
Two related explanations for the divergence are suggested which
may account for the difference in the number and content of the
opinions. First, despite the large percentage of schools involved, the
decision in Schempp may not have roused the political fervor in the
Northeast that was so evident in the South. If the southern citizens
and officials were more politically active, one might then conclude that
the attorneys general under such circumstances not only follow the
prevailing winds of public opinion in drafting replies when advice is
requested, but also play a necessarily diminished role in enforcing
compliance, because other officials and organs of government do not
deem it useful to seek their advice on the politically controversial issue.
Second, differences in number and content of the opinions may be
explained by the views the attorneys general and other state officials
hold toward their offices. The difference in number may stem from
the possibility that northern officials feel more bound to request formal
opinions from their attorneys general than southern officials, who
may prefer to maintain the greater political flexibility afforded by
informal consultation or no consultation at all. An explanation of the
substantive variation may be that the attorneys general in the North-
east feel more of a professional obligation to comply with Supreme
Court rulings, whereas their southern counterparts, in abstaining
from active opposition to public sentiment, to take a more political view
of their role.
The evidence is inconclusive, but seems to incline more towards
the explanation of a different perception of office than towards a
difference in the amount of political activity. Approximately the same
percentage of northern governors supported the Constitutional Prayer
Foundation as supported that organization in the South. Northern
representatives also supported the prayer amendments in the House in
79 See text accompanying notes 81-82 infra.
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numbers disproportionate to the size of their delegation.s" Only the
fact that no governors in the Northeast made nationwide statements
condemning the decision would seem to support the hypothesis of
greater political reaction in the South, but this is insufficient to account
for the discrepancy in the interpretations of Schempp found in the
opinions issued in each region, or the differing number of opinions
requested.
On the other hand, it is quite possible that the difference in the
number of opinions sought may be explained by the attitudes of the
state officials who would be in the position to ask the attorney general
for advice in guiding their conduct. If the southern administrators
wanted to be free to select a course of blatant defiance, such a course
would obviously require no formal outline of what was essential for
compliance. It may be argued that the letter of the law should be
known in order to establish a semblance of legitimacy, even if the
intention is to thwart its spirit; but such information could have been
provided by informal consultation in the South, though this study
provides no direct evidence of such consultation. Whether there was,
in fact, a stronger desire of northern officials to discharge their duties
in harmony with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Schempp and,
consequently, greater activity in formally seeking the counsel of the
attorney general also cannot be answered without analysis beyond
the scope of this study. Moreover, it is not clear if the decision to
seek a formal opinion is dependent on the personal attitudes of par-
ticular officials or on their role expectations, or both. Northern
officials may generally seek more formal counsel with their attorneys
general than their southern colleagues who may rely on informal access
or personal acumen.
It is clear, however, that whatever determines the frequency of
requests for opinions from the attorney general, the better explanation
of the substantive dichotomy between southern and northern opinions
(since political reaction to the Supreme Court's holding showed little
variance) is the different perception the attorneys general in each
region have of their office. In the North, the attorney general appears
to feel bound by the norms of his position to bow to relevant legal
pronouncements, whereas in the South the position may be less pro-
fessional and more political. The southern attorney general may
evaluate his response not against the norms of his office, but against his
personal and political point of view.
80 This area constitutes 289o of the House, but contributed 31% of the resolutions
and testimony in favor of the amendment. 1964 Hearings, suPra note 72, at table of
rontents V-XVI.
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Such an explanation is supported by a comparison of attorney
general legal judgments before and after the Schempp decision. Before
the case was decided, both groups seemed to think that prayer and
Bible reading should be permissible in the public schools. Nine of the
11 southern attorneys general and 8 of their 13 northern brethen sup-
ported one or both of the briefs presented amicus curiae to the Court
in Schempp and Engel.8  After the case was decided, however, 6
of the 8 northern signers were able to lay aside their former point of
view and pen opinions in full support of the Court's decision. 2  By
contrast, none of the 4 southern attorneys general who joined the briefs
felt obligated in later opinions to depart from his former position and
support the decision unambiguously.'4
The essentially "neutral" political attitude of the attorneys general
in the North is borne out by the fact that they were willing to support
the Court in the face of feelings of hostility which were later ex-
pressed in the legislative movement for a constitutional amendment.
The attorneys general of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania
were apparently unmoved by the political attitudes of their respective
state legislatures which culminated in resolutions in support of a
prayer amendment. Unfortunately, comparable data is not available
for the South. No southern attorney general clearly supported the
decision; however, the attorneys general of Maine and Connecticut did
so in the face of governors who strongly supported the prayer amend-
ment. The attorneys general of Maine and West Virginia urged
compliance despite the fact that 50 per cent or more of their con-
gressional delegations introduced resolutions in support of the
amendment.
8 4
On the other hand, in the 2 northern states where the attorneys
general resisted or where their opinions were ambiguous,85 the governor
was also a strong advocate of the prayer amendment.8 6  Such guber-
natorial support for resistance, while present in North Carolina, was
not manifest in either Arkansas, Georgia, or South Carolina,87 where
the opinions were in direct defiance of the Court's interpretation. Un-
81 See app. C, p. 827 infra.
82 Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
For citations, see app. A, p. 822 infra.
83 See text accompanying notes 46-59 supra.
84 For a complete listing of "political" data, see app. C, p. 827 infra.
85 Delaware defied the decision; New Hampshire was willing to have state offi-
cials create "voluntary" prayer groups. See text accompanying notes 46-47, 60 supra.




like several other southern states, the majority of Congressmen from
Arkansas and Georgia did not introduce bills in support of an
amendment.88 Thus we conclude that northern attorneys general will
comply despite the political climate, but that those few who do resist
feel the political support of the governor a necessity. In the South,
the attorneys general will follow the political mood he perceives as
prevailing, and even if such a mood is not represented by statements
of other elected officials, the attorney general does not feel bound to
follow the Court's cue. He is willing to act on his own political
acumen against the standing decision.89
V. EFFECT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL EFFORTS ON STATE PRACTICE
Whatever the motivation of an attorney general's action, his policy
sets the tone for state response to the decision. In the vast majority
of cases, his opinion was requested by the state commissioner of
education who thereafter acted in full accord with that opinion.90 State
commissioners even followed the attorney general's lead when he ad-
vised action contrary to the face of the Court's order. The State
Commissioner of Education in Georgia based his continued advocacy
of prayer and Bible reading squarely on the opinion of the attorney
general when quizzed by the press.' In Delaware, the action of the
State Commissioner, based on the advice obtained from the attorney
general, precipitated litigation.' Only in Idaho did a state commis-
sioner act directly against the decision of the Court without specifically
requesting an opinion. It should be noted, though, that the attorney
general came to his aid in the pursuant litigation." Since the attorney
general might have initially advised the commissioner that he was
violating the law of the land, it is a fair assumption that he agreed
sub rosa with the practice followed." The state commissioners of
Oklahoma and Rhode Island, however, seized the opportunity pro-
8 8 See app. C, p. 827 infra.
89 The independence of southern attorneys general may betray further political
aspirations, possibly for the Governor's chair. Cf. Krislov, Constituency Versus
Constitutionalism: The Desegregation Issue and Tensions and Aspirations of
Southern Attorneys General, 3 MIDWEST J. Pot.. ScI. 75 (1959).
9o From the only survey available on the subject, it appears that state educational
officials generally favored the decision, though many were not willing to express
an opinion. See Katz, Patterns of Compliance with the Schevnpp Decision, 14 J.
PuB. L. 396, 403 (1965).
91 Dawidowicz, supra note 31, at 44.
132 Johns v. Allen, 231 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del. 1964).
Q3 Adams v. Engelking, 232 F. Supp. 666 (D. Idaho 1964).
94 Cf. OKLA. AnT'y GEN. OPINios 66-256 (1966), 67-123 (1967) (mimeograph),
& note 36 supra.
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vided by the silence of their attorneys general to resist the enforcement
of the decision; both states condoned, but did not require, Bible
reading. 5
One commissioner who was predisposed against the Court's action
consulted his attorney general and subsequently followed the legal path.
Kentucky's State Commissioner of Public Instruction was quoted fol-
lowing the Schempp decision as having said: "Continue to read and
pray till somebody stops you. I don't want to make anybody stop." 90
However, the commissioner then requested a formal opinion from the
attorney general who voided Kentucky's mandatory statute. When
queried about a year later, the attorney general reported there was no
appreciable noncompliance in his state. Nonetheless, since the initial
opinion, other aspects of the issue have been raised in a subsequent
opinion, implying that the department of education may have been less
than effective in setting the proper standards in this area."
The advisory opinion is not the only means by which state
attorneys general influenced compliance or noncompliance with the
Court's will. In 3 states, Idaho, Delaware, and Florida, all of which
required prayer and Bible reading, attorneys general went to the bar
in defense of traditional state practice.
Only in Delaware did the suit compel a federal court to overrule
a formal opinion by the attorney general. Though the court did not
strike down the opinion per se, it ruled unconstitutional the directive
of the Superintendent of Schools as well as the practice of a local school
board, both of which were grounded in the formal opinion.08 The
point of view expressed by the Attorney General of Delaware, and
rejected by the court, was also expressed in the Georgia and Arkansas
opinions, but no suits have been brought. In fact, at least one other
case in Delaware was quashed by local pressure,' before Johns success-
fully brought suit.
The Idaho case was simply a successful suit brought against the
state commissioner of education for relief from mandatory prayer and
Bible reading in the schools. The attorney general argued the case, 100
but issued no formal opinion on the subject. The attorney general did
report noncompliance with the Supreme Court's original decision up
95See Dawidowicz, .pra note 31, at 44; Beaney & Beiser, sIpra note 28, at
487-88.
96 Dawidowicz, supra note 31, at 44.
97 See [1964-1968] Ky. AT'y GEN. Op. No. 64-111.
8 Johns v. Allen, 231 F. Supp. 852, 858 (D. Del. 1964).
99 Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 491 n.91.
100 Adams v. Engelking, 232 F. Supp. 666 (D. Idaho 1964).
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until this case was settled. However, the interesting aspect of the
case was not the action of the state officials, but the "reservations" of
the court: "While members of the court may have personal reserva-
tions, we unanimously agree that the issue is settled by the United
States Supreme Court ruling in School District of Abington Tp., Pa.
v. Schempp." 101
On the same day that the Supreme Court announced the Murray-
Schempp decision, it remanded Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of
Public Instruction 102 to Florida for review in accordance with the new
precedent. The remand seems to have confused the Florida Supreme
Court, or so they told the appellees.' 3 As the case before them
involved such practices as Christmas services and baccalaureate exer-
cises, as well as prayer and Bible reading, the court claimed it did not
know how to distinguish constitutional from unconstitutional practice.
It turned to the attorney general for advice and requested a brief
amicus curiae which the attorney general contributed. 04 Unfortunately,
that brief was not made public, and upon its receipt, the court acted
very peculiarly. It reaffirmed its original denial of an injunction
against any of the practices involved, holding that Florida practice
could escape the Supreme Court's prohibition because the intent of
the Florida legislature in passing laws requiring prayer and Bible
reading, among other practices, was clear:
It is our conclusion that the statute was founded upon
secular rather than sectarian considerations and is to be con-
strued as was the Sunday Closing Law in the McGowan
case. The statute, designed to require moral training and the
inculcation of good citizenship, does not offend the establish-
ment clause of the Constitution as written and intended by
the authors. The accommodation of religious beliefs is
secondary to the intent of the Legislators.' 5
The Supreme Court did not accept such an interpretation and
again remanded the case.' The Florida justices, still evidencing
confusion, dutifully obeyed.'0 7 Whatever this case indicates about
bu0 Id. at 667.
102 143 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1962), vacated and remanded, 374 U.S. 487 (1963), aff'd
160 So.2d 97 (Fla.), rev'd in part, 377 U.S. 402 (1964), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
171 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1965).
103160 So.2d 97, 98 (Fla. 1964). Of course, the Florida Supreme Court is famous
for its "confusion" in the case of Virgil Hawkins: see W. MURPHY AND C. PRITCHETT,
COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS: Ax INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROcESS 606-18
(1961).
104 160 So2d 97, 98 (Fla. 1964).
105 Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted).
106 377 U.S. 402 (1964).
1D7 171 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1965).
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Florida's judicial process, it demonstrates the use to which an
attorney general may be put in such matters. That the attorney
general created this defense is not certain, but he specifically supported
the state court's position in testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee. 108
In 2 out of these 3 cases the courts showed great sympathy for
the position defended by the attorney general, but this sympathy may
be linked to the subject under consideration rather than to the fact
of the attorney general's participation. In 2 of the 3 cases involving
the application of the Schempp decision where the state attorney general
was not involved, federal district courts upheld local practice. Ad-
mittedly, the issues in these cases left the courts some room for fresh
interpretation; for example, one of the prayers eliminated direct mention
of God.0 9 The Courts of Appeals in both cases found the Schempp
prohibition applicable, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari." 0
The failure of these courts to fully support a broad interpretation
of the Supreme Court's opinion suggests that the state attorneys general
may be as good as the lower courts at securing compliance with
Supreme Court law. Of the 9 cases to date involving an application
of Schempp,"' 3 were decided against the Court's interpretation, only
to be overturned later, and one, the Idaho case, expressed certain
'reservations," though upholding the Court's conclusions. Only 2
of 19 attorney general opinions directly rejected the Court's decision,
1081964 Hearings, supra note 72, pt. 3, at 1854-63.
10 9 See DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 255 F. Supp. 655
(N.D. Ill. 1966).
110 Both Stein v. Oshinsky, 224 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 348 F.2d
999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965) and DeSpain v. DeKalb County
Community School Dist., 255 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ill. 1966), rev'd, 384 F.2d 836
(7th Cir. 1967), cert. dended, 390 U.S. 906 (1968), upheld prayer and Bible reading
in the district courts. In Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965),
parents of public school children brought suit against the superintendent of schools
and members of the board of education to enjoin certain religious practices as viola-
tions of the free exercise and etablishment clauses of the first amendment. The
court recommended that during an interim period, students who wished to say prayers
could do so before school began and after it ended, provided they met somewhere
other than a homeroom, the exercise began at least 5 minutes before regularly sched-
uled classes, no bell signified the start of the exercise, and any prayers during lunch
were silent. Id. at 54-55.
"'l See apps. A-B, pp. 822 & 826 infra. The 9 cases here tabulated only include
cases found in federal or state reporters. In only one instance do the authors know of
an unreported, but related case: Snavely v. Cornvall-Lebanon Suburban Joint School
Sys., Civil No. 8355 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1965). Snavely asked for an injunction
against the school system to stop Bible reading as well as to prohibit the teaching of
a proposed course in religious studies. The disposition of the case was delayed while
school officials discussed the proposed course in religious studies with the State Depart-
ment of Education; the school system stopped Bible reading of its own accord.
Following the delay, the school officials decided against their proposed curriculum
on the advice of state educators. With these developments in mind, Judge Follmer
denied the plaintiff's petition on the grounds that the activities complained of had
stopped, or failed to begin.
[Vo1.117:795
ATTORNEYS GENERAL
and 4 additional ones offered a narrow interpretation. It would seem
that the attorneys general cover more territory and do it more
effectively.
This conclusion is even more warranted when it is noted that
it is the attorney general who often directs the courts to their con-
clusion. A state attorney general participated in 5 of the 9 litigations
on the issue and was on the winning side in 3, not to mention the
recipient of "reservations" in a fourth."2 We have so far described
only those cases where attorneys general were opposing the Court's
opinion; however, 2 attorneys general went to court to support their
formal opinions which voided the relevant state statutes in favor of
the Court's conclusion. Their stories provide good examples of
attorney general initiative and the role of the court as "legitimatizer."
Having advised their respective commissioners of education re-
garding the implication of the Schempp decision, the attorneys general
of Massachusetts and New Jersey expected statewide compliance, but
this was not the case. Attorney General Sills of New Jersey was
faced with the blatant refusal of Hawthorne Township to cease and
desist saying prayers and reading the Bible in public schools. Haw-
thorne maintained that in Doremus v. Board of Education 11 the
Supreme Court, by rejecting jurisdiction, had upheld New Jersey's
statute, that Hawthorne's practice was still law, and therefore Bible
reading could and should continue. Sills answered this challenge by
taking the Board of Education to court. The judge was not impressed
by the Hawthorne argument and, in fact, felt it his duty to lecture
the town from the bench:
The directive by the Attorney General and the Commis-
sioner of Education has been directly flaunted by the de-
fendants. The impression which this made or will make on
the children of Hawthorne cannot be measured with pre-
cision. Suffice it to say . . . [it] is not conducive to good
moral training, strength of character and a healthy respect for
the law . ... 14
Defiance in Massachusetts involved a small rural community in
the western half of the state, North Brookfield. The local school
112 A fifth case, Waite v. School Comm., 348 Mass. 83, 202 N.E.2d 297 (1964),
could be included here because the Attorney General of Massachusetts, in his prosecu-
tion of a similar case, Attorney Gen. v. School Comm., 347 Mass. 775, 199 N.E.2d
553 (1964), set the relevant precedent. On the other hand, this case could be assigned
to the earlier category containing cases in which the attorney general played no part.
We have left it unassigned.
-1135 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
114 Sills v. Board of Educ., 84 N.J. Super. 63, 67, 200 A.2d 817, 819 (1963), aff'd,
42 N.J. 351, 200 A.2d 615 (1964).
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board, upset by the implications of the Court's decision, voted that
traditional practices should continue in their community as long as
possible.
Their defiance came to the attention of the Commissioner of
Education when he made a routine survey of the state to check com-
pliance and the practices substituted for the previously required
prayer. After extended correspondence between the Commissioner
and the School Board, and then between the Attorney General and the
School Board, continued defiance forced the Attorney General to file
for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to comply. The town
expended the necessary money to meet this challenge and carried the
issue to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, but there it
met unanimous defeat." 5 Throughout, the Attorney General was
helpful, but firm, with the town. He hesitated to take the issue to
court as he hoped to emerge from the situation politically unscathed,
but he did initiate litigation when all other avenues failed." 6 In fact,
in both these cases, the courts were courts of last resort for the attorney
general; his style was not to press litigation, but to work more quietly
for compliance. Yet it is through the attorneys general that many
courts received their introduction to such problems, and from them
that they often take their cue.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this case study has been to generate hypotheses
concerning the role of the attorney general in the enforcement of
Supreme Court decisions. Several hypotheses have developed:
(1) Attorneys general are active interpreters of Court decisions
when a state statute requiring a uniform practice is unequivocally struck
down, and, in the absence of such a statute, when the issue has not
been dealt with by the state legislature or judiciary.
(2) The opinions of the attorney general usually attempt to create
a balance between popular opinion and the law. The nature of this
balance may be related to his "role expectations"-specifically, to the
degree he allows political and personal pressures to influence his actions.
Role expectations may vary regionally.
(3) The attorney general is at least as useful as the lower courts
in the enforcement of Court opinions. In fact, the attorneys general
115 Attorney Gen. v. School Comm., 347 Mass. 775, 199 N.E.2d 553 (1964).
116 For more detail on this case, see R. Benedetti, The Leadership and the Issue:
Bible Reading in North Brookfield, Massachusetts, 1964 (unpublished thesis for
Amherst College).
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are often the route by which such cases reach the courts. Nevertheless,
the attorney general does not frequently use this avenue to accomplish
his goal; his opinions are respected without judicial assistance." 7
Though a further evaluation of all these hypotheses would be of
interest to a student of comparative state practice as well as of the
judicial process, the last two have important policy connotations as well.
Compliance is probably best served via a professional attorney general.
He may be more effective than the courts and less political than the
governor. In any case, the attorney general should be studied in the
context of his national as well as his state responsibilities. The utility
of much that the Supreme Court hands down may be measured by
the abilities of such officials. Their functions deserve further scrutiny.
117A further fact supports this hypothesis. When questioned about compliance
with the opinion in their states, no attorney general who had written an opinion in
support of the Court, except North Carolina where the opinion had been vague,
reported major instances of noncompliance. Yet in those states where the attorney
general wrote an adverse opinion, or where he was involved in pending court action,
he reported major noncompliance. Beaney & Beiser, mspra note 28, at 491 n.92.
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An opinion was written by the attorney general.
** Litigation involving the Schenipp/Alurray decision.
* Litigation and an opinion.
a. Beaney & Beiser, supra note 28, at 491 n.92.
b. Id. 501.
c. 1964 Hearings, supra note 72, at able of contents V-XVI.
d. Id. 120,
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